

EXHIBIT NO. 141

Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events Leading up to it.

- 16 October 1940. Received report from Japanese sources in Mexico of intentions to bomb four (4) Battleships on 17 October 1940. This report conveyed in person by me to CINCUS (Admiral Richardson) then at San Pedro, Calif., with three (3) Battleships and one (1) Heavy Cruiser. Official report made to C.N.O. (D.N.I.) by Comdt 11th. Naval District, San Diego. (See O.N.I. files for copy.)
- 11 November 1940. Assisted in Investigation and recommendations regarding Intelligence facilities in Hawaii. This being conducted by Capt. W.K. Kilpatrick U.S.N. on orders of CINCUS (Adm. Richardson).
- 14 November 1940. Discussed with Admiral Block the vulnerability of Fleet at Pearl Harbor and recommended certain measures for security. Obtained his permission to have sent to Honolulu certain key men to build up the Intelligence organization.
- 9 February 1941. Letter to Admiral H.R. Stark USN regarding my conversations with Admiral NOMURA at San Francisco on 8 Feb. (Copy attached).
- 11 February 1941. Letter to Admiral H.E. Kimmel USN regarding NOMURA conversations and the existing situation. (Copy attached).
- 17 February 1941. Reply of Adm. Stark to my letter of 9 February. (Copy attached).
- March 1941. Conversation with Admiral Kimmel (CINCPAC) and his Chief of Staff (Capt. W. Smith USN) regarding NOMURA interview, and SURPRISE ATTACK on our Fleet by Japanese in case hostilities eventuate. Details of this conversation are covered in a Personal and Confidential Memo to Chief of Staff to Cincoep, Rear-Admiral Milo Draemel, USN, for presentation to CINCPAC (Admiral Nimitz) and dated March 17, 1942. (Copy Attached).
- 16 September 1941. Letter to Admiral Stark urging caution, and other matters. (Copy attached).
- October 1941. Japanese discussion of chances of success of air attack on Pearl Harbor, Copy of this presented to Capt. C.H. McMorris USN (Planning Officer on staff Cincus) a translation of "When Japan Fights", by Naosaku Hirata. (Copy attached).
- 20-25 October 1941. Extensive conversations with an Investigator from Washington, Mr Curtis B. Munson, (believed to be from high levels) carrying a letter from Admiral Stark (CNO) to "open everything to him". He was given an accurate picture of the situation existing and how it would develop. He was told to "forget about uprisings and sabotage" about which he was most concerned because the Japanese would start the war "With an air attack on our Fleet for the purpose of disabling four Battleships. Some details are included in my memo to Adm. Draemel, mentioned above and copy attached. (See Munson authentication attached.)
- 13 November 1941. Conversation with Lieut. C.H. Coggins, (MC) USN, (Attached to Intelligence organization), regarding existing Officer Morale and lack of readiness for war. Details included in report to Fleet Intelligence Officer, same date. (Copy attached).
- 20-25 November 1941. Conversations with Lieut. Coggins regarding existing low army morale. Details in Confidential memo to District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District, Honolulu dated 5 December 1941. (Copy attached).
- Nov. 1941 Conversations regarding failure to apprehend Seven (7) Japanese agents found photographing Kaneohe Naval Air station on all sides, on 4 November 1941. (This one of first spots hit by attacking aircraft). Details available in O.N.I. Files, including Teletype report to F.B.I. Office in Honolulu. For whole Intelligence situation, this known only to Officer in Charge of Investigations, Lt-Comdr. W.B. Stevenson, USNR, now at Honolulu. (See letter from Dir-For State P.H. Division dated 17 Nov. 1940 - 3 Memo's to you 17 Nov.)
- 27 November 1941. Detailed discussions with Mr. Lorrin B. Thurston, Head of Radio Station KGU, Honolulu and Editor of Honolulu Advertiser regarding present serious situation and preparation of his radio station for necessary broadcasts at time of air attack.

26 November 1941 Sailed with Task Force 8 (Adm. Halsey) for Wake Island.

2 December 1941, News report of arrival in Washington of Japanese Ambassador to Peru. This was indicated by me as one of the conditions which would bring a "break" one way or another, in my conversations with Munson and others.

5 December 1941, Report from CINCUS that unidentified submarine had been reported in the operating areas on night on 4 December.

This was the condition on which I had advised all in my conversations, including Admiral Mimsel, that the Japanese would be ready to strike. From 1800 to 2400 endeavored to intercept Japanese conversation on Radio short wave. There was nothing that would have justified any report to my Task Force Commander or CINCUS.

7 December 1941 (0800) When Communication Officer reported the attack on Oahu, switched on Radio and ECU Honolulu was sending out the words we had discussed on the evening of 27 November.

At night we joined the USS Detroit and Destroyers and Scouted to the Southward for the Enemy. Nothing sighted. Entered Pearl Harbor at daylight, 8 December.

Additional Items which Indicate Contributions to P&PI HARBOR.

Facilities for espionage provided by the newspapers in Hawaii, particularly those in Japanese language.

Details are emphasized and summarized in a report to CINCIPAC immediately after Pearl Harbor and dated 7 January 1942. (copy 200 4-3)

Lack of Security Indoctrination of Naval Officers and Inadequate Security Facilities.

Details are summarized in a letter to CMC via CINCIPAC dated 27 January 1942 (copy 200 4-3)

Inadequate selection of officers for Intelligence duty.

Details summarized in letter to CMC via CINCIPAC dated 27 January 1942. (copy 200 4-3)

Inadequacy of Intelligence Functions before Pearl Harbor as indicated by Memo to CINCUS dated 2 January 1942, as requested by a member of his staff.

Letters from DNI (Rear Admiral) W. O. Anderson indicating need for designation of agreements with FBI.

In reply refer to No.

Cp-16-B

JR3/WD

42-8

Serial No. 0325016

C O P Y

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Office of Naval Intelligence
Washington

CONFIDENTIAL

November 19, 1940

Dear Zacharias:

Thanks for your letter of November 5th. You are quite right that clarification is highly desirable. Enclosed is a copy of an official letter stating that such action is now under way.

The fact that some clarification was desirable has been apparent to me ever since the F.B.I. letter was written. However, that F.B.I. letter was not a directive insofar as the Army and Navy were concerned, and I awaited an auspicious moment in which to obtain the clarification. The White House statement of 6 September was really intended to inform the law enforcement officials to whom they should report certain information, but, unfortunately, named only F.B.I., whereas it should also have stated that subjects of a certain character of direct interest to the Army or Navy should also be reported to the proper officials of those departments. Anyway, there soon will be something in the hands of the members of all three intelligence services which will clear up this particular matter.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

CONFIDENTIAL

W. S. Anderson,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Director of Naval Intelligence.

Captain E. M. Zacharias, U.S.N.,
Eleventh Naval District,
Naval Operating Base,
San Diego, California

Enclosure

C O P Y

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Office of Naval Intelligence

WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.

Op-16-B

JR3/ND

A2-8

(SC)AS-5

Serial No. 0324916

Nov. 19, 1940

CONFIDENTIAL

From : Chief of Naval operations.
To : Commandant, Eleventh Naval DistrictSUBJECT : Cooperation with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.References: (a) Com. eleven confidential letter Serial No.
I-519 of November 8, 1940.

1. Receipt of reference (a) is acknowledged.
2. This Office concurs with the desirability of the situation being cleared up with respect to the President's directive of 26 June 1939 and the Federal Bureau of Investigation letter of September 6, 1939 quoting a White House statement. Steps are now underway to prepare a joint directive which will clear up the matter.

W. S. Anderson,
By direction.

cc: DIO-13

CONFIDENTIAL

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U. S. S. SALT LAKE CITY

Mare Island, California,
February 9, 1941.

My Dear Admiral:

I think that you will be interested in a conversation which I had with Admiral Nomura yesterday. It lasted for more than an hour and we were alone the entire time in his room at the hotel. Having known him intimately and severely over a long period we were in a position to speak frankly. I decided to arrange for such a conversation in order to determine if possible the reasons for which he was sent over here and to explore, if possible, the latitude which might be in his hands. As a result of the conversation I have formed the following impressions:

(1) That Japan regrets her partnership in the Pacific and is greatly concerned over the China venture, therefore Admiral Nomura was sent here to determine the best bargain to be obtained. (A previous thought that he might be coming to "look us to sleep" while Japan proceeded to the southward, has been eliminated definitely).

(2) He will try to prevent an embargo on oil and other essentials now being obtained here, and will request reconsideration on those now under embargo.

(3) Japan definitely has decided that they cannot "conquer" China or exert sufficient control while Chiang Kai-shek maintains his present position and strength. They realize that their best way out is a peace. This will be a toughed fight by trying to dissuade us from further aid to China, thereby allowing the Wang Chin-wei group to gain control under Japanese direction. If this is impossible he will then explore the other possible means of bringing about peace in China.

(4) That hostilities between Japan and the U.S. can be avoided if he is given sufficient basis for an approach to the Leaders in Japan. (I indicated to him that an immediate definite indication of sincerity by Japan would have to be forthcoming if our Government opposed such an approach. When he asked what for example I replied "If I were asked, I would say 'Immediate cessation of all Japanese activities in China and French Indo-China'". He made no comment on this.

In the course of the conversation he made the following positive statements:

- (1) That his mission was to prevent a resort to force between Japan and the U.S. in settling present disagreements.
- (2) That Japan has completely changed her views with regard to China, and that peace is essential to both countries.

U. S. SELF DEFENSE

(3) That if the U. S. is patient until Europe is settled then the Far Eastern situation will take care of itself. (This statement I took to be a feeler, therefore I resisted an impulse to ask him if impatience meant probability of force by us in the Far East). My reply was optimism over British prospects which prompted the question from him "Do you think it will be a long war?". My answer was negative and reason given was the effect upon the German people when they finally hear of U. S. aid to Britain.

(4) That the signing of the Berlin pact was done only after a sharp division of opinion and with only a slight balance of influence in its favor. Now, the mistake is realized but as it is a "fait accompli" nothing can be done towards cancelling it. It must die a natural death. (The previous day a leading Japanese business representative in San Francisco referred to the signing of the pact by Japan as a grave mistake. When asked what could have brought this about he stated without hesitation and authoritatively that it was accomplished by bribery of officials with tremendous sums of money from Germany.

Details of Conversation

After the usual exchange of pleasantries I opened the conversation by indicating to the Admiral that I thought he had been given a most difficult task and asked him how he expected to handle it. He said "My hope is to prevent a resort to force in settling the difficulties existing between our two countries. I replied, "Of course you know that at least 85% of the American people are reconciled to any action as far as the Far East is concerned, and you yourself have often said that such a conflict would be disastrous for Japan and entail great loss for the U. S. We have no desire to see Japan defeated and destroyed. We saved her in 1904, you will agree?" He answered in the affirmative, and I continued, "Well, we would like to save her again because the very same reasons exist today. The American people have long since learned that a strong Russia or a strong China means the end of Japan, in which case problems for us will come from other sources. I have always told the Japanese that we would go to war if our Commerce was blocked off, because that has been the cause of every war in which we have engaged. Now see what has happened to all Foreign trade in Manchuria, what would happen in the rest of Asia?" At this he apologized for their extremists and I reminded him that they are the ones who bring on wars. I then said, "Admiral, one thing which the American people can't reconcile is why Japan, a country which has called continually for 'Equal Opportunity' could sign a pact with Germany which has done away with all opportunity and has the utmost contempt for all other nations?" He replied that there was a sharp division of opinion in

U. WASHINGTON CITY

Japan as to the advisability of making the pact and that only a very slight balance of influence made it possible. No, they realize the mistake but it is a "fait accompli" and it is practically impossible to cancel it. Therefore it will have to die a natural death.

"Admiral, I would like to know why you think you can pick a man like Wang Chin-wei, set him up and count upon him working for Japan?"

"He replied that we were for peace in China and that this war very necessary now to combat the growing menace of Communism which has spread Russian influence as far south as China. "In this case", I said, "it seems to me that you want a man like Chiang Kai-shek to combat it, as he has been so successful for over ten years. That is where you ought to make your agreement if you really want the peace of Asia, and here in fact the U.S. might act as mediator and again save Japan. With communications as now exist in China you will never be able to conquer or control it. Peace in China will bring prosperity to all three of our countries. Your objective of warlike and raw materials will be realized. Our complementary trade will thrive again and there remains only the problem of taking care of Japan's expanding population. Let's explore the realm of possibility. Do you think that if Chiang Kai-shek should be willing to cede Manchuria to Japan in return for the protection it would afford Asia from the inroads of Communism, would you then be able to go to the Japanese people and say 'Japan has at last reached her original objective, we can now stop the war in China and settle down to prosperity', do you think it would be accepted?" This question was evidently unexpected for after such hesitation the Admiral leaning back then seriously said, "It would have to be handled very carefully, you know how excited the extremists become in such matters and the steps they take." I replied that I remember well the affair of 1932. "That of course would clear up the rest of China for a resumption of normal affairs under the careful direction of Chiang Kai-shek and the long desired development could ensue. The fears of Japan about a strong China in Asia or an over strong China would disappear." The Admiral again indicated the difficulty of approach to such problems in Japan at this time, but I said that the more difficult they were the more important they become. And I added, "Of course, you understand that if Japan really wants the U.S. to assist in solving this serious situation without resort to force, which you say is your opinion, then there would have to be an immediate definite indication of sincerity by Japan." He then asked, "But for example?" I replied, "If I were asked, I would say I would see cessation of all Japanese activities in China and French Indo-China." He made no comment on this and remained thoughtful for an appreciable interval.

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Washington, D. C.
February 11, 1913.

Dear Admiral Kimball:

Some time ago when I advised Admiral Richardson that I intended to contact Admiral Hoare upon his arrival in the United States, Admiral Richardson requested that I give him the results of our cooperation. As these have been incorporated in a letter to Admiral Stark, I am enclosing a copy of it for your information.

It is my opinion that a new situation has developed which might or might not affect previous estimates.

With kindest regards and best wishes,
I am

Sincerely yours,

W. S. Kimball.

Admiral S. D. Kimball, U. S. Navy
U. S. S. Albatross
U. S. Fleet Post Office
Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii

10 September, 1941.

My dear Sir:

It is gratifying to see that there is possibility of reviving the Japanese situation, but we must not relax until we have even concrete demonstrations of sincerity.

I am writing particularly to invite attention to a matter which I consider most urgent and opportune in view of our present relations with the British. I am writing to you because I do not want Captain Kirk to feel that an "old timer" was trying to impose his views on a new arrival, and in this case I would want him to be most receptive.

I have tried unsuccessfully for years to get from the British practically beneficial ideas, such as picture files of Japanese Naval officers, and, also, technical ideas on the British counter-explosive systems. With the new and present relations in all of this should be available to us. I am certain that no one has gone after the things I consider most important. I know that our Attache's and assistants do not have the broad work necessary to pursue these items. Counter-espionage is a profession in itself requiring schooling and volitional reading, none of which our people have undertaken. I know of only a few officers qualified to undertake this work. The FBI sent two men to London for several weeks, but I dare say they spent most of their time at Scotland Yard on methods of investigation. Investigation and counter-espionage are as far apart as the poles; therefore, FBI, while excellent in their own field of investigation, will never be able to do our work for us, because counter-espionage and counter-fifth column activities are basic military operational functions.

I have in mind a man who is now working for the Commander-in-Chief, and he pleased him with results. This man I had ordered to Honolulu to help build up the organization in that most vital spot. When I arrived in Honolulu last November to take command of the 31st Liaison Group, I was asked to assist in a survey of the Intelligence Organization, and this resulted in radical changes in and additions to personnel, space, and equipment. With the training now instituted here, I am beginning to feel some of the security which we had in the 11th District. As soon as the necessary work now underway is well along, both ashore and afloat, this man should be available to make a trip to London. He is Lieutenant C. F. Collins (MC), and being a doctor his analytical abilities and

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...the ever, will also rise in own from the inter-
 action of combat medicine and surgery. We are well known in
 U. S., having recently completed their investigation
 report. These scientists, some time ago, advised us we could
 use the services necessary.

Of course I look forward to the day when I will be
 in the position to continue to work out the many ideas which I
 hope to be vital to our Intelligence Organization, as you
 know, the Commander-in-Chief has expressed himself as to the
 need of a sufficient and thoroughly effective Intelligence
 Organization. In the past it has been a difficult "selling"
 job, but I hope eventually to make our people, particularly the
 higher ones, realize the important elements. Last June, while
 in Washington, Admiral Anderson asked me one day if I would be
 willing to sacrifice my career for Intelligence. I replied,
 "Admiral, the time has come when if we don't think about
 sacrificing our careers, there won't be any sacrifice".
 Of course, I am delighted with my stipend and will soon have in
 mind of my two years in grade, but if and when the situation
 demands my statement above still stands.

With kindest regards and best wishes, I am,

Sincerely yours,

ELTON H. MCGUIRE.

Admiral F. R. Stark, U.S. Navy,
 Chief of Naval Operations
 Navy Department
 Washington, D. C.

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District Intelligence Office
State Department
Honolulu, HawaiiCONFIDENTIAL

CHC/Ao

December 7, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: The District Intelligence Officer.

Subject: Army Air Force, Hawaii.

1. Solicited information regarding the morale of local Army troops has come to the attention of the writer several times in the past two weeks. The nature of this information is such that it is difficult to determine to what authority it should be attributed. From the disclosure of these informants it is nevertheless self-evident that steps should be taken to correct the conditions now existing.

2. To begin with, the new informants who frequent places visited by Army and Navy enlisted men report that the experienced soldier of the regular Army is disgusted and baffled by the uniform coddling attitude which is shown the enlisted men of the new Army. This soft handling has resulted in greatly reduced discipline both of the regular, the volunteer, and the selectee. The newer additions to our Army have become aware of their immunity against disciplinary action and have taken full advantage of this immunity to an extent which enrages and disgraces all regular non-coms who have seen service prior to the present emergency. An example of this attitude is shown by often-repeated incidents in which a newly-enlisted private will push a sergeant out of the way in order to obtain his food out of turn. This is a far cry from what is usually accompanied by some sarcastic remark as "Excuse me, Sergeant, this is the new Army." The non-commissioned officers have all learned to their chagrin that it is useless to place the enlisted man on report for infractions of the regulations because the officers, with few exceptions, support the offender, reprimand the petty officer and give a lecture upon the baseness with which the enlisted man is to be handled. The few officers who are known to have made an attempt to inculcate proper discipline and to enforce this discipline by assigning punishments in accordance with the regulations and the traditions of the Army have been removed from their positions by higher authority. For that matter the regular Army are confused and their morale is seriously injured by the existing policy and they do not know what to do about it.

3. The morale of the Army Air Force appears to be particularly poor. It is not known whether present conditions are due to the necessity for rapid expansion which is faced by the Air Force, whether insufficient care is used in the selection of new recruits. The situation is not, however, entirely experienced Air Force non-commissioned officers and enlisted men attribute a large percentage

C. M. ...

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
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[The text in this section is extremely faint and illegible. It appears to be a list of items or a set of notes, possibly related to the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack.]



MEMORANDUM FOR: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
(continued):

- (3) Take appropriate action immediately on any intransigent or continually skeptical key officer who is unwilling to assume responsibility for positive action or recommendations.
- (4) Continue and speed up training in all the above specialists' jobs. (This war is going to require many replacements and we have too few already).
- (5) Give Commanding Officers afloat digest of pertinent intelligence activities with which they might be confronted or which might add to general plan (this should have been a comprehensive peace-time activity but it is not too late to correct).

7 January 1962.

Memorandum for the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Interview with the Military Governor (General
Wheeler) regarding reestablishment of Japanese
Language Newspapers in Hawaii.

In accordance with the directions of the Commander-in-Chief, Captain E. M. Zacharias, U.S.N., accompanied by Captain I. E. Mayfield, U. S. N., OIC 14th Naval District, called upon General Wheeler to present the views of Captain Zacharias on the Japanese Language newspapers, with a view to establishing reasons sufficient to prevent resumption of the publication of these papers in Hawaii. After delivering the Commander-in-Chief's message, the General was advised of my background of twenty years connection with Naval Intelligence and status as a Japanese Language Officer, and the following statement was then made: "There is concrete evidence that Hawaiian newspapers in the past have been used for espionage purposes. There is concrete evidence that enemy agents are still at large in the Islands. There is concrete evidence that enemy transmissions of information have not been stopped. It is therefore firmly believed that unless the writing, editing, and printing of these Japanese papers is done by Caucasians, they can and will be used for transmission of information to the enemy".

The General then asked how such information is transmitted, which I explained as coded conversation, chosen words, advertisements, etc. He then said that this would be checked

carefully by his people to see that there were no derelictions. I explained that there were no translators whom he could obtain who would be sufficiently grounded in espionage technique to be able to pick up any such insertions. He then admitted that the work on the paper would be done by second generation Japanese. I then explained the influences and pressures that had been exerted on these people for many years and that with all the time that I have worked on them I am still to receive a single bit of information which we knew them to have and which any real American citizen would turn over to his government. (I forgot to tell him that this pressure extends to liquidation and is an effective method of the narcotic and gambling ring whom we know work with enemy agents and are used to keep people in line). I then asked the reasons for republication, which he explained was for morale purposes, stating that because of the large number of Japanese who cannot read English he thought that it would be a big morale factor for the population if they could get news in their native tongue. In addition he would be able to get to them refutation of claims that are made on the Tokyo broadcasts. I explained that this could be done just as well in the English newspapers and was certain that the second generation would keep their barabuts informed of everything appearing therein. Why should we be so solicitous about the alien Japanese? These are the ones who are our most dangerous suspects. We know that for years these people have had their assigned details.

at some point in the conversation the General made the

statement, "What is the use of stopping the newspapers when there are so many other sources of information open to them". (This supine acceptance of an intolerable condition is most amazing). I replied, "We should stop all of these sources and if we don't start somewhere we are not going to make any headway". He said, "We have no censorship of mail between the Islands and that is an easy method for the agents". I then said that if this is necessary, it should be done also. He then remarked that the mail was piling up tremendously now, which I advised was a good form of censorship in lieu of the other, provided it is held long enough.

The General then questioned the availability of Japanese agents and I had to say that he would find that there are at least six hundred and probably more key men still at large. The conversation then turned to the methods of picking them up which I assured him could and should be done. Upon asking how, I told him by a general round-up of all first generation (alien Japanese), all second generation who have been in Japan from early childhood, because they (the very dangerous group known as KIBEI) have been in touch with the younger elements in Japan who are the ultra chauvinists upon whom the Nazis have worked and it is they who have brought about the present situation; and finally all the second generation who have been continually in contact with visiting Japanese Dignitaries, Naval Officers, etc., all of whom should have been listed in the files. At this he expressed general inability to do such a job for several reasons; first, "We need these Japanese for labor, it is a different situation from the coast ²

where there is a labor market. Then there is the problem of housing and feeding all of this large group if taken in, and we can't spare the lumber and materials and time to do this extensive work, if we are going to prepare for another attack. Our first job is to get all these ships out of the harbor before another attack comes". I then emphasized that the one way to bring the Japanese back for another attack was let their agents have freedom of movement to get information out, because they will have sufficient exact data necessary to operate as they did before. We should create the impression of being fully prepared and of welcoming a return. The General, perturbed replied, "Oh no. We wouldn't welcome a return".

The general then said that he was not worried about information getting out but was more concerned with the sabotage that might take place at the time that an attack is to be made. I then explained that the sabotage threat did not exist in Hawaii because they did not have any access to industrial activities, utilities, etc., as they did on the West Coast, except the one power plant here which was not vital, and the dock facilities. I then outlined the vulnerability of the West Coast and the steps I had taken in July, 1940 in Washington to put into effect concrete plans utilizing all existing governmental agencies for a general round-up before their efforts could be successful. He then insisted that his communications here were vulnerable although strategic points were under guard.

He reaffirmed again the necessity for the Army preparing to repel attack, to which I replied that the first step in such a move is to deny information to the enemy and if we hope to keep them from coming back we had better take in all of their agents. He expressed belief that FBI and MID were doing all they could and I had to say it is obvious that what had been done is not enough. Incidentally, I was the one who tried over a period of two years to have M.I.D. implemented by giving Colonel Oldfield (GE-9th Corps Area) ammunition for letters to Washington. Nothing would be done until M day. I was the one who gave F.B.I. its start from the Eleventh Naval District. I know exactly what both agencies have and their capabilities. He then asked what more could be done. I replied it is absolutely necessary to round up every Japanese of any generation to whom any suspicion attaches. Those few already in custody are only the ones on whom concrete evidence is in the files. The other can be apprehended and must be.

We then made moves to break off the conversation at which time the General made the statement, "I am not going to stop the newspapers unless it can be proved to me that they are being used for espionage purposes. I have the dual responsibility here of preparing the defenses and of keeping up the morale of the people. I replied, "The morale will be of little consideration if we allow them to originate a belief that we are displaying signs of weakness, and from my knowledge of them I can say definitely that republication of these newspapers will be so viewed. And if we

let them know that we have any fears, or are relaxing in our vigilance and do not take the proper steps to curb the activities of their agents, we are encouraging them to come back.

He reiterated his decision to let the papers go to press, until it can be proved further that they are being used for espionage purposes.

I stated that we would make that attempt. This, he indicated, he would be glad to have us do. It is therefore assumed that our Intelligence service is authorized to obtain from the Army all data regarding the methods of handling those publications and to cover all individuals connected therewith.

Conclusions

It is my considered opinion that the sole consideration of the Army is devotion to the effort of building their defenses so that they will be able to defend Oahu from an attack in force by the enemy Fleet with enemy air support from one of the other islands upon which the enemy will be able to establish a base.

It is further considered that in formulating their plans, there has been no consideration whatever of the psychological factors and characteristics of the Japanese.

That no consideration is being given to the possibility of preventing such an attack by denying information to the enemy, which fact allowed them to work with such complete accuracy in the previous attack.

That the above situation is an extremely dangerous one for the Navy and that immediate action should be taken to remove every element of such danger. It can be done and must be done.

There is definitely a lack of any thought of the Fleet and its protection. They are thinking only in terms of combat defense.

Recommendations.

It is recommended that the Commander-in-Chief as Senior Officer Present prevail to prohibit the publication of these Japanese newspapers, and that he take necessary steps to obtain coordinated and cooperative effort on the part of all governmental agencies in the area, in order to remove the menaces noted above.

Respectfully,

E. H. ZACHARIS
Captain, U.S. Navy.

CONFIDENTIAL

Facts concerning the reopening of the Japanese Language Newspapers.

If it is proposed to resume the publications mentioned, Nippu Ji Ji, and Hawaii Hochi, it is most important to know who will write, edit and supervise the material which will appear therein. If it is planned to use the editorial staffs which managed the papers previously, the whole proposal may be regarded simply as a very dangerous experiment. Both of these papers have always been strongly pro-Japanese, and frequently anti-American. The sentiments of the staffs cannot be expected to change overnight, or by request. Having for many years been absorbed in the furthering of Japanese ambitions, we may expect these people to seize every opportunity to turn the new publications to the advantage of Japan. This can best be done by using the newspaper as a secret means of informing local fifth columnists of intended plans. Announcements of this sort are now impossible, except by telephone. The resumption of newspaper publishing will give the enemy a means of widespread signaling. This will be almost impossible to detect --- the whole story may be told in a misplaced comma or a misspelled word.

Any person who scoffs at the above idea as fantastic, obviously knows nothing whatever about either German or Japanese espionage practices. The idea is being used at the present moment in every city in Europe; it is years old and is standard practice in every Intelligence organization.

Let us consider for a moment who are the persons now in charge of the two newspapers under consideration -- who have not been placed in detention: On the Nippu Ji Ji, we have the son of the owner. The owner himself, Isutaro Soga, is under detention because of both espionage and propaganda activities. The elder Soga was a member of the advisory council of five which met with the Japanese Consul in affairs of the Japanese State. His newspaper has for many years been violently pro-Japanese and frequently openly anti-American.

The son, Shigeo Soga, was born in Hawaii, educated on the mainland, "traveled" in Japan. He has been completely in his father's confidence in matters concerning Japan, and has represented his father's newspaper in important matters for several years. To our undercover informants, he has revealed his real pro-Japanese feelings on many occasions. To entrust this man with the resumption of publication would be extremely dangerous. However, much the same situation exists with regard to the rest of the staff. None of them can be trusted, in the light of past experience.

In the case of the Hawaii Hochi, the editor is an Eurasian named Makino. He is the son of an Englishman named Higginbottom and a Yokohama girl named Makino. He took his mother's name, and is now known as Fred Makino. More than ten years ago this man led the Japanese people in a court action instituted against a bill introduced in the Territorial Legislature for the control of foreign language schools. Makino is known as a violent and previously outspoken pro-Japanese, formerly a leader in Territorial labor movements.

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He and his agents have identified and shadowed our own counter-espionage agents on some occasions. It is hoped that neither he nor any member of his staff is seriously considered as proper supervisors of a Japanese paper in war-time.

It is freely admitted that it is desirable to print information for dissemination among the local Japanese which will counteract the Japanese propaganda -- but such a project cannot be safely carried out unless the publication from top to bottom is staffed by dependable persons, who must be Caucasians.

There is no reason whatever why the refutation of such propaganda from Japan cannot be effected in the English newspapers and broadcasts all of which are used by the second generation, who are the ones we are trying to reach. The alien Japanese should not be a consideration.

Another consideration must be recognized. That is the feeling of the local Filipinos. If the Japanese newspapers are printed and distributed, they, being unable to read and judge for themselves the contents, are bound to be very seriously disturbed about it. We know very definitely that they are already very much agitated and it can be said without hesitation that we cannot, for the sake of local peace and harmony, afford to further disturb their confidence in the Government. Race riots are a definite possibility from this source and this warning should be recorded.

Mr. Ryan

Danger in Resuming of Publication
for Hochi and Kippu

We presume that these two Japanese newspapers will resume publication under the strict censorship of the Military Government, but we must consider of some dangers will be caused by the publication in the Japanese language.

1. It will give a greater encouragement to the older Japanese aliens who are now very optimistic over the war situation in Manila.
2. It will help to build the morale for Japanese victory upon the minds of the younger Japanese (or American citizens) who are under absolute control of their parents.
3. It will give a greater chance to the enemy (Japanese) agents in using these papers for conveying their ideas of secret activities in the plain language (using slang, proverbs and poems).

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File No.
C.35/AB

(10-enc)

27 January, 1943.

From: Captain Ellis M. Zacharias, U.S. Navy.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via : The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Security Indoctrination, necessity for.
Enclosure: (A) Intelligence Bibliography for Naval Officers.

1. One of the principal difficulties encountered in establishing a really effective security program in the Navy arises from a basic lack of appreciation by many naval officers of the vital necessity therefor. Even in the higher ranks, despite accumulated experience of years, there have been instances of surprising obtuseness and regrettable lack of appreciation of the scope and importance of intelligence work. In some instances officers have gone so far as actively to oppose necessary security measures apparently feeling that such measures reflect both upon the integrity of their men and constitute unwarranted restrictions upon their own freedom of movement and expression. In others the simplest and most elementary efforts to safeguard the establishment against penetration by foreign agents and subversive elements have been largely nullified by the apathetic or skeptical attitude of responsible officers.

2. The foregoing is especially true of shore establishments and yet, in general, these stations offer greater opportunity for espionage and sabotage with less chance of detection than any other portion of the naval establishment. The technical excellence of our material, our progressive design policy and our acknowledged world leadership in Naval Aviation, all offer rich rewards to the foreign espionage agent. Many of our shore establishments by reason of construction and grouping of buildings and other equipment offer rich prizes to the saboteur.

3. Having been a nation more or less insulated in the past from the intrigue and espionage of Europe and the Orient, we appear to have developed a rather widespread belief that the spy and the saboteur are creatures confined largely to those areas and are existent in this country chiefly on the silver screen or in the sensational magazine. That this blissful state of affairs does not, in fact, exist is becoming increasingly apparent as is also the fact that the Navy as a whole and its officers in particular must be indoctrinated with a sound appreciation of the

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(10-rae)

27 January, 1942.

Subject: Security Indoctrination, necessity for.

vital importance of intelligence and an intelligent grasp of its scope and methods. In view of the unfortunate lack of any such program of indoctrination at the Naval Academy, the Postgraduate School, or in the service, such indoctrination and training must, in a large measure, come through aroused interest, reading and study by the individual officers themselves.

4. That this situation exists cannot be doubted by anyone who has taken part in the informal group discussions held in the wardroom or the officers' clubs ashore. Logically it must follow that, as the result of this widespread feeling, the Navy offers an easy field of activity for the enemy agent. It is known that this is the reputation which we enjoy abroad. It is so easy to obtain information here that to do so can hardly be regarded as a noteworthy feat.

5. The need for proper indoctrination of personnel is considered acute. It is well realized that they must acquire this indoctrination under their own power. To attempt to drive or force them to security efforts will only succeed in alienating them and thus placing the security program further than ever from accomplishment. Therefore, they must be lead and instructed in such a manner that they will not be aware of forces tending to direct and change their opinions.

6. It is believed that the best way to accomplish this end is to direct their thoughts to the proper channels by means of reading matter placed at their disposal. If the majority of officers can be induced to read of espionage matters, they would indoctrinate themselves and their former ill-founded convictions would disappear.

7. As a means of arousing interest in this vital subject on the part of the average officer, the appended list of books relating thereto has been prepared. These are entirely of the non-fiction variety and include the best in the field. They are arranged generally in the order of recommended priority. Reviews of the more important ones are included.

8. It is believed that this list provides the basis for a concrete and logical course of reading and study in this important field. It is therefore urgently recommended that it be

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(10-enc)

27 January, 1942.

Subject: Security Indoctrination, necessity for.

printed or mimeographed and given wide distribution ashore and afloat and that, insofar as possible, the books listed be supplied to the appropriate activities. If necessary to obtain reprints of those now out of print, this should be done at the earliest opportunity and in sufficient quantity to provide several copies for each ship and shore station. If necessary, to reduce expense and save time, these books should be reproduced in paper cover form by any one of the many publishing houses who do such reprint work.

9. The enclosure was prepared by an officer of the Navy who has worked continually and in conjunction with the writer, but for certain reasons his name is withheld at this time, but it is largely through his efforts that this excellent compilation has been made. Proper recognition has and will be made for his work.

E. M. ZACHARIAS.

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File No.
CA25/10

(10-enc)

27 January, 1943.

From: Captain Ellis M. Zacharias, U.S. Navy.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Selection of Officers for Intelligence Duty.

1. The following letter, prepared more than a year ago was withheld awaiting more favorable circumstances which would ensure attention. Under the present circumstances it is felt that it should be forwarded immediately:-

The greatest single weakness of our Naval Intelligence today lies in the fact that our officers are selected for reasons other than special fitness for this kind of work. For many years officers throughout the Navy have been assigned to Intelligence work for trivial or irrelevant reasons and with little regard for the aptitude or personal qualifications of the officer concerned. They have been given Intelligence work as collateral duty because they have had little else to do. Until quite recently they have been inducted as Naval Attaches largely because they were socially inclined. Some have been recruited because they were of foreign extraction or could speak, sometimes haltingly, in a foreign tongue. Some owe their assignment to fortuitous circumstances or their own curiosity and interest.

In consequence of this policy, Naval Intelligence, already inferior in numbers and financial support, when compared with similar organizations abroad, has become inferior in quality as well.

A brief consideration of other Intelligence services reveals the marked contrast which exists at the present time, and goes far to explain the causes underlying our inferiority.

The Intelligence services in other countries is regarded generally as a career which demands the highest individual qualifications, and whose members deserve and receive the most careful and intensive training. The foreign conception of the Intelligence branch is that it serves as the eyes, ears and memory of the fighting forces, and that, for this important duty, the best men are none too good.

In selecting agents, foreign governments comb their entire services for candidates who can meet the highest standards of

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U. S. S.

(10-rac)

29 January, 1948.

Subject: Selection of Officers for Intelligence Duty.

character and aptitude and who give promise of profiting from a program of strenuous training. In at least six foreign countries the chosen agent is sent to school for periods of two to four years and the successful graduates are returned to these schools at intervals throughout their careers. As a student he is trained to observe, to remember, to classify and to evaluate. He studies the arms, equipment, uniforms, organization, history, geography, language, plans and policy of the countries with which he is to match wits. And he, in turn, is studied by older Intelligence officers to determine his special qualifications and how they may best be utilized. After finishing his courses in general Intelligence the officer begins to specialize, and, in two of the world's first class powers today, this specialization has been carried to the point where he may be assigned to espionage or counter-espionage against one potential enemy only. The officer remains in this section for a long period of years or for his entire career, constantly perfecting his knowledge of the enemy.

It is easy to realize, when we compare our own haphazard and casual selection of intelligence officers with the realistic and efficient methods employed abroad, that, in this endless battle of wits which we are fighting in peace and in war, we find ourselves practically helpless against the overwhelming odds imposed by the superior numbers and training of our opponents. When the American Intelligence officer, selected almost at random, and without training worthy of the name, pits himself against the elite of other services he is badly outmatched, and the resulting struggle must be called, in many instances "no contest."

What is to blame for the present situation? Probably many contributing factors are involved. This country, enjoying geographical isolation from other great powers and relatively long periods of peace, has been lulled by our wealth and growing power into a false sense of security no longer justified in the light of world events. This "Pook's Paradise" is shared by large proportions of our ranking officers, few, if any, of whom have ever received intelligence training in their long, peaceful careers. Yet now, when world tension increases and espionage is carried on wholesale, we must depend upon these officers to initiate a policy of realism for which their experience so inadequately prepares them. Ranking officers belittle the thought of spies or the suggestion of dangerous sabotage from within, they

File No.
Ca25 AB

(10-rae)

27 January, 1942.

Subject: Selection of Officers for Intelligence Duty.

laugh at the possibility of subversive threats to our morale, they have spoken disparagingly of the Intelligence service, regard Intelligence officers as mere embellishments of the service, and resent and even combat efforts aimed at effecting security. Meanwhile foreign agents throng to our shores, the Spy's Happy Hunting Ground, and steal and buy military and naval secrets out from under the noses of these same officers. Two of our latest cruisers had spies working aboard during construction and during trial runs without being apprehended. They were even allowed to take blueprints home with them at night. Not a single spy has been caught in this country in the last fifteen years as a result of forthright and efficient counter-espionage work. The few who have been apprehended fell victim to purely accidental and unfortunate circumstances and blunders.

Therefore, the writer regards our first great need as proper indoctrination of all officers, particularly those in command.

The second great need is for training of Intelligence officers. This should be begun by a general course given in the line P.O. school. It should comprise no less than one hundred hours of instruction. This course would achieve two worthwhile purposes. First, it would indoctrinate all officers in a subject scarcely less important than any other technical subject, and second, it would serve as a basis course from which to select young officers who are qualified for advanced study and careers in which assignment as Intelligence officers would play an important part.

The present futile gestures in the direction of training for Intelligence must be converted into a real effort. A long list of courses of instruction exists at present merely on paper, and serve only to mislead those concerned with our efficiency in this branch. The "building" of an efficient Intelligence officer requires more time than the construction of a battleship and, as a common sense precaution, cannot be delayed until flashes of gunfire are seen on the horizon.

File No.
CASS/AB

(10-rac)

27 January, 1942.

Subject: Selection of Officers for Intelligence Duty.

The Standards of a Good Intelligence Officer

The officer selected for Intelligence duty must have special personal and temperamental qualifications to be successful in that duty. He must possess a mental alertness which will enable him to cope with agile and clever opposition, fortified by ample financial resources. He must be imaginative enough to visualize the possible plans of enemy agents and at the same time be sufficiently analytical to properly evaluate the information which comes to him. There must be in his natural or acquired make-up a certain amount of suspicion and disbelief. He must be mentally aggressive and possess the initiative required to plan effective operations. He should be discreet and not garrulous, and should understand human nature, its strength and its weaknesses. Additionally, he should be willing to hazard his own personal standards of conduct in the accomplishment of an important objective contributing to the national welfare in time of war.

He must be realistic. He must have the ability to see things as they are, and to have the courage to bring them to the notice of his superior.

The orthodox and conservative type of naval officer is designed by training and indoctrination not to be an Intelligence officer. For this reason the selection of personnel from the Navy for this type of duty should be made early in the officer's career so that he may be trained in the stratagems of this important branch of the service.

2. It is recommended that this letter be given wide distribution among the officers of the Fleet as coming from the Commander-in-Chief, in order to promote a general interest in this subject and encourage reading and study of books related thereto. A selected list of such books has been forwarded this date to the Chief of Naval Operations.

E. M. ZACHARIAS.

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J. H. H. C. 1
 C. 1000

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

March 17, 1942.

Memorandum for Admiral Draemel

In accordance with your request after our conversation this morning, the following memo is submitted:-

My conversation with you is impelled from a sense of duty because of what I consider a serious situation existing in Hawaii. Once before, in such a situation, I gave concrete opinions and advice which apparently could not break through preconceived ideas. History was about to repeat itself and no one would believe it. I have no personal ambitions or desires regarding the subject matter other than assuring that we have a safe and well protected base for our Fleet, which is the sole reason for the existence of Hawaii. It has been my attitude that it makes no difference who does a job as long as it is done efficiently and thoroughly.

Any criticism direct or implied is offered solely from a constructive viewpoint and is for the purpose of preventing in the future a recurrence of a disaster such as that of 7 December.

Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral Kinnell and Captain Smith, during the course of an hour and a half conversation with them, of the exact events to take place on 7 December, not only as to what would happen, but also how and when. My only error was that the Japanese were after four battleships and they got five. I also gave them the reasons for my conclusions and advised them of the steps necessary to prevent such an attack. From time to time, in contact with the Staff, I would voice possibilities and only two months before the attack amazed at unrealistic attitudes I said, "When are we going to stop these surprise inspections and prepare for surprise attack". About that same time Mr. Munson, a representative from Washington, (believed to be a Presidential agent) carrying a letter from Opnav to "open everything to him", sought me for an expression of views on probabilities and my opinion as to what action should be taken with the Japanese here and on the West Coast. After outlining to him my firm conviction that if Japan decided to go to war with us it would open by an air attack on Pearl Harbor, on a weekend and probably Sunday morning, with all the reasons therefor, and I then stated, "You now have two envoys in Washington. When the third one arrives you can look for it to break immediately, one way or the other". This envoy arrived in Washington about 2 December 1941

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On the night of 27 November, after dinner with Lerrin Thurston, Head of the Honolulu Advertiser and KGU, I related the impending possibilities as above and he said, "Here I am a G-2 Officer and I haven't even been advised what to send out over the radio in case of an attack". I advised him precisely to say, "We are having a sporadic air attack, everyone should keep calm and remain indoors. Do not go on the streets as it will prevent the military from getting to their stations. There is nothing to worry about". On 28 November I sailed with Task Force 8 for Wake Island. Upon receipt of CincPac's despatch on 7 December, "The Islands are being attacked this is no drill", I turned on my radio and KGU was sending out my exact words. At least someone believed it. This was probably made certain by the press announcement about 3 December that the Ambassador to Peru had arrived in Washington as a third envoy. Seeing this, Mrs Thurston reminded her husband and they were alerted.

On Friday, 5 December, having received a report of a submarine off Oahu - one of the things I gave Admiral Kimmell as a positive indication of intention to attack - I listened all evening on short wave for Japanese conversation. All was garbled conversation but the intensity of the acknowledgments (typically Japanese) indicated to me that something was imminent. I tried to obtain a single word which would justify me in requesting ComTaskFor 8 to advise CincPac, but nothing could be made out. I knew what the reaction would be to a recommendation from thin air and I assumed that proper warnings would be coming from Washington.

I have made it a point when afloat to give my advice to Intelligence activities both ashore and afloat and when necessary even to the point of "butting in". I had tried for years to have detailed a Fleet Intelligence Officer who was not tied up as Flag Secretary or on other jobs. Finally two years ago Commander Dyer advised me that Cincpac was going to have a Fleet Intelligence Officer. I recommended Lt-Commander Layton, who has consistently done a splendid job in an office where there should have been twenty officers instead of two. Early in November I was about to see Captain Smith and advise that he get some help for Layton and Hudson as they were both worn down and appeared ready to crack up. But I hesitated, wondering why should I have to advise Cincpac on the adequacy of his force. It should have been obvious to any Commander that Intelligence at such a time was his most vital issue. I decided not to approach Smith, because I found that Intelligence was not receiving its proper recognition.

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One of the contributing factors to 7 December was the reluctance of Admiral Kimmel to assume his prerogatives and tell the Commandant to carry out directives or some one else would be obtained to do the job. The possibilities of an unpleasant situation should have been readily apparent to the Department when a former Commander-in-Chief is put under a younger man. Petty jealousies are bound to be present and these grow into opposition. A typical indication was one incident which I observed closely. When I arrived in Honolulu in November, 1940 to take command of the Salt Lake City I was asked to assist in a survey of the District Intelligence Office which was initiated by the Commander-in-Chief. It was learned then that recommendations had been blocked and that the office was of little value.

This survey included immediate and extensive recommendations, including trained personnel to be taken from my old 11th District to build up the 14th as quickly as possible.

The next day, after telling Admiral Bloch the security we enjoyed in the 11th and indicating the complete lack here he approved all steps to remedy the situation. Accordingly, the personnel arrived and expansion, planning and training were rapid. During the course of a subsequent survey to outline faults in the District, the report or digest was brought to the attention of Admiral Bloch. This survey was made by an officer who was working for the Commander-in-Chief and also helping the District. At the sight of this critical survey coming from the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Bloch gave vent to his wrath and Intelligence activities suffered for quite a time.

The skepticism of the Commandant regarding necessity for security was also typical from a remark once made during security efforts, "Bring me a Japanese spy. I've never seen one and would like to see one". His yard was full of them.

On 16 September, 1941, in a letter to Admiral Stark, I stated, "It is gratifying to see that there is a possibility of resolving the Japanese situation, but we must not relax until they have given concrete demonstrations of sincerity".

All of the foregoing is simply to indicate the possibility of qualified personnel accurately estimating the situation, and the distressing fact that nothing was done about it.

I am now concerned because of another situation which is growing in seriousness and proportions. Rumors are increasing and I find not only the morale of civilians falling lower and lower but also that of Naval Officers. This is a typical

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fifth column technique and it must be stopped. It not only softens up our own people but it is throwing the second generation Japanese into the laps of enemy agents, many of whom are still not in custody. I used to be most optimistic about the Japanese never returning here for another raid, but the persistence of the present situation, which they will learn about soon enough, will be an invitation to them to return. This situation can be corrected somewhat by strong "offensive" pronouncements but not by "defensive" ones, and by punitive action against rumor mongers. I found one woman frantically engaging passage because an Army man told her how terrible the gas attack would be when it came. Someone is spreading a rumor that there is to be a Japanese Fleet attack on April 14th. I am now trying to trace the source of some rumors. Rumors are sometimes started to enhance the position of an individual or organization.

Apparently, on the West Coast they are undecided how to handle the Japanese situation. Here, where it is much more difficult, I find that little or nothing is being done. Make no mistake about it, the proper handling of this situation requires two qualifications: first, highly professional Intelligence activities, and second, a thorough knowledge of the Japanese people. The Army in Hawaii has no one qualified to handle either. I know what they have and what they are capable of doing. It makes no difference who does the job as long as it is done efficiently and thoroughly. But I venture to make the first statement that little or no results have been received on cases turned over to them by the 14th Naval District. I find that the numerous Japanese amateur operators have only been admonished by letter only not to operate. Adequate searches have not been made. Known suspects have not been taken into custody. Strategic locations are still endangered by the presence of enemy aliens. The problem can be solved in forty-five days by qualified personnel and intelligent action.

In my long interview with General Burns, I was impressed with his incompetence. He appeared to have no thoughts of his own. He gave as the reason for continuing the Japanese newspapers that they were necessary for the morale of the enemy aliens. At the same time, the Army has assembled all the second generation Japanese into one battalion of the Territorial Guard and have disbanded it. The selectees have been disarmed and put into labor battalions. This action will have the effect of sending these

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boys slinking home and into the laps of enemy agents. It is most serious. There are sensible solutions to all these problems which certain of us have worked out, but it is inadvisable to let incompetent hands take on pre-prejudiced solutions.

After my interview with General Hanson, I searched for the reasons for what seemed like an undue influence upon him. Yesterday I think I discovered the answer. I was told that one of his principal advisors on Island and Japanese matters is General Wells, a highly paid official, of one of the large local industries whose objectives are still "maintenance of the status quo".

At the present time the Army is endeavoring to take over control of the Intelligence Organization in Hawaii. Under those conditions the Commander-in-Chief would be tying his own hands voluntarily. Their past and present training and performances in no way qualifies them for the work. I know their capabilities and what they have because it was I who for many years, tried to have them implemented on the west coast, but the War Department invariably replied, "No action will be taken until X day". As a result they "had not a single trained Intelligence man with which to start an organization". The quotations are from General Miles, the head of G-2.

The Naval Intelligence Organization of the 11th District has been built up and trained through the intensive effort of two excellent officers with years of experience behind them. Through their knowledge, excellent personnel have been enrolled and trained and I am sure in saying that in spite of obstructions which should have been help, this organization is so far superior to the Army and F.B.I. for Intelligence work that there is no comparison.

Conclusion

Hawaii, as a defense outpost of the United States, is of value solely as a safe base for the Fleet. The protection of it provides the only excuse for the existence of the Army. An offensive attitude is a requisite to that defense. This offensive attitude does not exist. Under the present state of administration, the influences at work, and the degenerating morale, I cannot escape the feeling that unless firm action is taken we are approaching a situation which might result in something worse than that of 7 December. (It has always been my considered opinion for a long time that because of the racial situation the Hawaiian Islands will eventually require a military government. Its purposes dictate that it should be a Naval military government, therefore now is the time to start it.)

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIALRecommendation

That the Commander-in-Chief, as Military Commander, exercise his function as Military Governor and take command of all activities that the administration of martial law be delegated to a Deputy, as at present, if such administration has been satisfactory, and that the Intelligence Organization be centered under the Commander-in-Chief, in order to insure the security of the Fleet and the Fleet Base.

That power of arrest be extended to special agents of the Naval Intelligence Organization. (The most vitally interested agency but the only government agency not having the power.)

That the security of the Naval District and the Navy Yard be incorporated under a competent head (The present security officer, Victor Houston, was recently removed from the Police Commission and it is inconceivable that he should be in a position to hamper Naval security.

E. M. SACHERIAS.

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"The American Commander-in-Chief has been occupied by various secret plans but the three points which he is the most concerned are:

- (1) Will a Japanese fast STRIKING FORCE made up of cruisers and aircraft carriers come on a scouting or striking mission?
- (2) Will Japanese submarines hover near the Islands to attack or harass the Fleet?
- (3) Will a Japanese Expeditionary force be sent overseas?

The first of these is the most fearsome. Suppose Japan were to form a fast striking force composed of such speedy battleships (whose speed America cannot match) as the HARUNA, KONGO and KIRISHIMA, the aircraft carriers AKAGI and KIJUJO, and the WACHI class of heavy cruisers? This would be a fast-stepping force that would be truly matchless and invincible! Were they opposed to even the large guns of American battleships, they could utilize their superior speeds, thus leaving their slow adversaries behind. If opposed to a cruiser force they could close in and with telling blows crush the opposition. Truly, this would be a peerless force; able to close to battle, or open out, if out gunned! If this Fast Striking Force should meet misfortune, losing one or two fast battleships or aircraft carriers, they would surely be a severe blow to Japan and we would have to grit our teeth, smothering our rage until the day of a decisive Main Engagement to obtain our revenge!

Maybe such a bold venture would be too great a risk, who can say? On the other hand, warfare is a risk and he who hesitates, or fears the risks of bold venture, cannot wage war! Moreover, an attack off Hawaii would be the first battle of the Pacific War and if in the very first engagement one can wrest the courage away from the enemy by ones own daring, it would put him in a funk or give him the jitters." ---

Excerpt from "WHEN JAPAN FIGHTS" by Mr. Matsuoka Hirota.

Washington, D. C.
July 20, 1942

I have read the revealed and Confidential report of Captain
E. B. Sweeney, U.S.N., as a memorandum for Admiral Braxton, dated
March 17, 1942, and desire to state that the remarks relating to
me and the outline given to me as indicated therein is exact and
correct in detail.

In addition he suggested that the attack would conform
to their historical procedure, that of hitting before war was
declared.

Arthur B. Kunson

Pertinent extracts from above report:

"About that same time Mr. Kunson, a representative from
Washington, (believed to be a Presidential agent) carrying a letter
from Opnav to "open everything to him", sought me for an expression
of views on probabilities and my opinion as to what action should be
taken with the Japanese here and on the West Coast. After outlining
to him my firm conviction that if Japan decided to go to war with us
it would open by an air attack on Pearl Harbor, on a weekend and
probably Sunday morning, with all the reasons therefor, and I then
stated, "you now have two envoys in Washington. When the third one
arrives you can look for it to break immediately, one way or the
other". This envoy arrived in Washington about 2 December 1941."